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NOTES
many businesses, these imbalances would tend to be equalized."s
Although certain difficulties mentioned above may be inherent in the
suggested method it appears to be superior to the present system.
John Michael Webb
The Borrowed Servant Doctrine As It Applies
To Operating Surgeons
I. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND THE BORROWED SERVANT DOCTRINE
The doctrine of respondeat superior is a great aid to plaintiffs in
prosecuting many types of claims. The rule, succinctly stated, is that
a master is liable for the torts of his servant committed within the
scope of employment. The employer's vicarious liability, an excep-
tion to the general law of negligence, imposes responsibility for the
loss on one who was not negligent and did not participate in the
injury. The legal principle of respondeat superior is firmly entrenched
in Anglo-American law, but its origin is uncertain. The many ex-
planations for its true basis range from a notion that a servant is the
alter ego of his master' to the pragmatical idea that public policy
requires that responsibility for the loss shift to the employer to better
indemnify injured parties.' The latter basis seems to be the best
justification for the rule because if claimants are to receive adequate
compensation, it is usually necessary that they be able to proceed
against the more affluent employer. To this end, respondeat superior
is consistent with the needs of a complex civilization.'
Under general agency principles, a servant may have two masters
states in which large manufacturing enterprises are located, because of the vague or non-
existent methods of apportionment, are able to derive more tax revenues by attributing a
larger share of the business' income to the taxing state. The method of apportionment sug-
gested above possibly could result in some discrimination in favor of the purchasing states.
48 The imbalances caused by discrimination against manufacturing states (e.g., Michigan)
might be roughly equalized by the slight discrimination in their favor in situations where
they are purchasing rather than manufacturing states. An illustration of this might be
found in comparing the effects on the state revenues of New York and Michigan in relation
to General Motors, a Michigan based operation, and International Shoe, a New York concern.
1 Mechem, Agency § 237 (4th ed. 1952).
2,[T]he use of the fiction that 'the act of the servant is the act of the master' has
made it seem fair to subject the non-faulty employer to liability for the negligent . . .
conduct of his servants." Restatement (Second), Agency, Intro. Notes § 219, comment on
Subsection (1) at 483 (1958).
3 "[D]amages are taken from a deep pocket." Batv. Vicarious Liability 29 (1916).
"See generally Mechem, Agency § 350-363 (4th ed. 1952).
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at the same time.5 If such a servant commits a tort, in order to apply
the principles of respondeat superior, it must be determined which
master is employing the servant for the purposes of that particular
act.! The test for determining whether the servant is the employee of
the general employer or the borrowed servant of a special employer
is based upon control.! It is generally held that the mere right of con-
trol is of itself sufficient to create a master-servant relationship; the
exercise of that right is not necessary! Of course, whether or not
there is a right to control and whether the right has been exercised
are questions of fact for the jury.'
II. THE BORROWED SERVANT DOCTRINE IN MEDICINE
The broad principles of agency apply with equal efficacy to all
employers. Thus, a doctor-employer is liable for the torts of his
employees on the same basis and to the same extent as any other
employer." There is little argument with this rule. However, ques-
tions frequently arise concerning a doctor's liability for the acts of
hospital personnel, who, although technically not the employees of
the doctor, assist him in some manner. In this type case the borrowed
servant doctrine is frequently applied to render the doctor liable for
his then-servant's negligent acts according to general respondeat
superior principles."
The borrowed servant doctrine as applied in the field of medicine
has produced some interesting results. The physician-patient cases are
sui generis in the law of agency because of the unique limitations
which have been placed upon a free application of the borrowed
servant doctrine and the right of control test. The cases generally may
be divided into two classifications-operative situations and non-
operative situations. In cases involving the operating room, it is held
by the great weight of authority that the surgeon is in absolute con-
trol of his assistants and nurses during the course of the operation
and is responsible for their negligent acts. Such holding is not altered
by the fact that these people are general employees of the hospital
'Dickerson v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 211 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1954). "A servant
directed or permitted by his master to perform services for another may become the servant
for such other in performing the services. He may become the other's servant as to some
acts and not as to others." Restatement (Second), Agency § 227 (1958).
eSee, e.g., Denton v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 284 U.S. 305 (1932).
'Restatement (Second), Agency § 220(1) (1958).
"See, e.g., Pennsylvania Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Duffin, 363 Pa. 564, 70 A.2d 270
(1950).
gRestatement (Second) Agency, § 220(1), comment c, 5 227, comment a (1958).
'°Simons v. Northern Pac. Ry., 94 Mont. 355, 22 P.2d 609 (1933).
" See cases cited note 12 infra.
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and receive their compensation from the hospital."2 The surgeon-in-
charge has been characterized as the "captain of the ship"13 because
in the operating room the surgeon's right of control is paramount.
It is implicit in the opinions 4 that the courts consider the doctor's
presence in the room as tantamount to his exercise of control over
his assistants. At least such presence gives rise to an eminent ability
to control and an actual opportunity to supervise. Distinctions are
drawn, however, in at least two situations,' subjecting the surgeon's
absolute control to limitation. If a nurse performs an act which is
normally the function of the hospital, the surgeon's right of control
is diluted; in such a case it may be held that the surgeon is not liable
for the nurse's negligence in performing such ministerial duties."8
Similarly, if the assistant possesses a professional degree of expertise,
the liability of the surgeon-in-charge may be eliminated." The courts
which adhere to these distinctions seemingly would require actual
1' See, e.g., Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936) (nurse left sponge inpatient);
Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957) (nurse allowed patient to fall from
table); St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 212 Minn. 558, 4 N.W.2d
637 (1942) (nurse burned patient with hot water); Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N.C. 259, 72
S.E.2d 589 (1952) (nurse negligently administered anesthesia); Aderhold v. Bishop, 94
Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1923) (nurse burned patient with hot water); McConnell v.
Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 69 A.2d 243 (1949) (attendant damaged newborn baby's eyes
with silver nitrate); Minogue v. Rutland Hospital, 119 Vt. 336, 125 A.2d 796 (1956)
(attendant exerted excessive pressure on rib cage during child birth). Contra, Guell v.
Tenney, 262 Mass. 54, 159 N.E. 451 (1928) (nurse miscounted sponges).
aMcConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
Traditionally, the surgeon has been granted authority to exercise control
over all activities and personnel in the operating room. All persons associated
with a surgical operation are under his direct supervision. Therefore, negligent
acts performed by his surgical assistants, nurses, or other personnel, whether
employed by him or not, are imputed to him by law in most states. . . . These
tenets have developed in common law out of legal and surgical necessity.
For upon some one person must rest the legal responsibility to the patient.
Wasmuth, Anesthesia and the Law 40 (American Lecture Series No. 448,
1961). (Emphasis added.)
4Cases cited note 12 supra.
" The medicinal vs. ministerial function distinction and the expertise distinction also
have been used to some extent in nonoperative situations. See note 17 infra.
13 Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. 2d 656, 62 P.2d 1075 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936)
(nurse prepared wrong anesthesia, preoperative) ; Clary v. Christiansen, 83 N.E.2d 644
(Ohio Ct. App. 1948) (negligence of scrub nurse not attributable to surgeon, operative).
For a discussion and criticism of the problems in attempting to implement this distinction
see Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 4 (1957).
" See, e.g., Thompson v. Lillehei, 164 F. Supp. 716 (D. Minn. 1958), aff'd, 273 F.2d
376 (8th Cir. 1959) (anesthesiologist allowed air embolism during operation); Ybarra v.
Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (anesthesiologist negligently administered
anesthesia); Sherman v. Hartman, 137 Cal. App. 2d 589, 290 P.2d 894 (Dist. Ct. App.
1955) (anesthesiologist was negligent in giving patient transfusion); Dohr v. Smith, 104 So.
2d 29 (Fla. 1958) (doctor-anesthetist negligently administered anesthesia); Hubert v. Prot-
estant Deaconess Hosp. Ass'n, 127 Ind. App. 565, 133 N.E.2d 864 (1956) (anesthesiologist
negligently administered anesthesia) ; Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 61 So. 2d
901 (La. 1952) (doctor-anesthetist negligently administered anesthesia during oral surgery);
Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941) (anesthesiologist broke
hypodermic needle off in patients spine). Contra, Voss v. Birdwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364
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presence or an inclination to control before the master-servant rela-
tionship will be found to be present, because the right of the
surgeon-in-charge to control still exists, and were this the minimum
requisite, the surgeon's liability would necessarily follow.
In nonoperative situations most courts are reluctant to hold a
doctor liable for the negligence of hospital employees."8 A patient's
well-being is a doctor's continuing responsibility, one that does not
begin and end within the confines of the operating room. The
doctor's right to control those who administer to his patients from
admission throughout convalescense is unquestioned; but, in the non-
operative situations, the courts are unwilling to accept the right of
control as being sufficient, standing alone, to give rise to a master-
servant relationship. The majority of opinions which speak in terms
of supervision and control imply that presence or an actual oppor-
tunity to control are prerequisite to the existence of a master-servant
relationship and the resulting application of the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior." In the more liberal jurisdictions the borrowed
servant doctrine has been given full play in the medical field. Even
though both an employee's professional expertise and medicinal vs.
ministerial function distinctions are recognized and often limit
liability, doctors have been held liable in the more liberal jurisdic-
tions in both operative and nonoperative situations under an ap-
plication of respondeat superior."° These cases, although probably
based on sound logic, represent a minority. The difficulties attending
the application of the medicinal vs. ministerial function distinction
to nonoperative situations make the right of control, in jurisdictions
in which it is recognized independently, an exasperating fact ques-
tion; and the various rationales behind the determination of which
P.2d 955 (1961) (anesthesiologist negligently administered anesthesia); Rockwell v. Stone,
404 Pa. 561, 173 A.2d 48 (1961) (hospital resident incorrectly injected anesthesia into
patient).
"See, e.g., Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (nurse broke hypo-
dermic needle off in patient, postoperative); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d
915 (1955) (nurse negligently administered anesthesia, preoperative); Huber v. Protestant
Deaconess Hosp. Ass'n, 127 Ind. App. 655, 133 N.E.2d 864 (1956) (nurse negligently
administered wrong anesthesia with hypodermic needle, preoperative); Davis v. Trobough,
139 Mont. 322, 363 P.2d 727 (1961) (patient negligently burned by nurse, preoperative).
Contra, Voss v. Birdwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364 P.2d 955 (1961) (anestheologist, a medical
doctor of anesthesiology, negligently administered anesthesia, preoperative); McCowen v.
Sisters of Most Precious Blood, 208 Okla. 130, 253 P.2d 830 (1953) (nurse allowed
patient to fall from table, surgical preparation); Rockwell v. Stone, 404 Pa. 561, 174
A.2d 48 (1961) (hospital resident injected anesthesia incorrectly into patient, preoperative);
Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283, 109 S.W.2d 417 (1937) (nurse allowed un-
conscious patient to injure himself, postoperative). All of the cited cases indicated by dicta
that if the negligent act had occurred during the operation the surgeon would have been
liable.
isSee authorities cited notes 12 and 18 supra.
"0 Cases cited following contra signal in note 17 supra.
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duties are ministerial and which are medicinal confound the imagi-
nation."
III. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND BORROWED SERVANT IN TEXAS
Generically speaking, the same agency principles exist in Texas as
in the majority of jurisdictions.2 Recently, the Texas Supreme Court,
in Newspapers, Inc. v. Love,2 held that "the true test for establishing
a master-servant relationship in a borrowed servant situation is
whether or not the alleged employer has the power (right) to con-
trol." The court regarded the power to control and the right to
control as being synonymous. In addition, Justice Norvell differen-
tiated "right of control" and "exercise of control" as being two
separate and distinct concepts, saying that exercise of control is evi-
dentiary, usable to show the extent and scope of the master-servant
relationship. It is clear, however, "that the 'right of control' remains
the supreme test and the 'exercise of control' necessarily presup-
poses a right to control....
The body of agency law in Texas with respect to the physician-
patient cases is largely undeveloped. Doctors have been held liable
for their own negligence," and also for the negligence of their em-
ployees. For example, an early case indicated that a surgeon would be
liable for the negligence of his employees over whose actions he had
dominion and control. The recent case of Porter v. Puryear5 s held
that the doctor-owner of a hospital and the operating surgeon both
were liable for the negligence of the nurse-anesthetist in adminis-
tering a spinal anesthesia prior to the operation. The doctor hospital-
owner's liability resulted from an application of respondeat superior
while the operating surgeon's liability was based upon the theory
that the two physicians were engaged in a joint venture. It is inter-
" See text and authorities accompanying note 16 supra.
12 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rust, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 359, 120 S.W. 249 (1909)error
ref. This early case recognized the rule that an employee could have a general employer
and a special employer at the same time and that a special employer, if he has the right
of control, is liable for the servant's negligence. Interestingly, this case, although not a
malpractice situation, has been cited in supreme court opinions from two other states in
malpractice cases sustaining the view that the surgeon is responsible for the negligence of
a borrowed nurse.
2'Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1964). It should be noted that
this case was decided by a bare 5-to-4 majority, with the minority dissenting very strongly.
Moreover, one of the majority has since left the court. It will be interesting to see if the
court will follow its holding in Newspapers if the question arises again in the future.24 Id. at 585.25 id. at 590.
"Moore v. Ivey, 264 S.W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), rev'd on other grounds, 277
S.W. 106 (1925).
"Lee v. Moore, 162 S.W. 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
2'153 Tex. 82, 262 S.W.2d 933 (1953).
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esting to note that in Porter v. Puryear the joint defendants attempted
to relieve the doctor hospital-owner from liability by asserting that
"the anesthetist, Baker, was acting under the direction and control
of [the surgeon] . . . in giving the spinal anesthetic,"29 thereby
tacitly assuming that the borrowed servant principle of agency would
apply to the operative situation. The court, however, did not meet
the issue of control, and the borrowed servant question remained
open. Although Porter v. Puryear involved a joint venture, it is still
significant because it does indicate that common law agency prin-
ciples can be applied to hold a physician liable, without negligence on
his own part, for the negligent acts of assistants whom he did not
hire.
IV. MCKINNEY v. TROMLY
The first Texas case to apply the borrowed servant doctrine in the
surgical situation is McKinney v. Tromley" A child died when his
lungs were severely burned by an explosion caused as the electrical
apparatus used by the surgeon, Doctor Tromly, came in contact with
the highly explosive ether anesthesia used during the course of a
routine tonsilectomy. In response to the special issues submitted, the
trial jury found the nurse-anesthetist, a hospital employee, negligent
in using ether because an explosion is likely to occur in better than
ninety per cent of the instances when the gas is used in conjunction
with an electrical apparatus. Because there was no competent medical
testimony establishing the surgeon's neglect, he was exonerated. In-
terestingly, the surgeon's right of control was stipulated. The court
of civil appeals reversed the lower court and held Tromly liable as a
matter of law for the negligence of the nurse-anesthetist, saying
"that the nurse, although in the general employ of the hospital, was
under the facts of this case an employee of Doctor Tromly while in
the operating room and under his control.'""
The practical result reached in McKinney is a good one. It seems
just that liability for negligent injuries to patients incurred in the
operating room should fall upon the surgeon, the man who has the
right to control the acts of his assistants and the man to whom the
patient looks for his protection. The surgeon is truly the man in
charge. Unless there are extenuating circumstances which relieve him
of his responsibility, the surgeon should answer for the torts of his
borrowed servants whether or not he expressly ordered the servant
to perform a certain act. It would be poor public policy to allow a
29 ld. at 938.





surgeon, by remaining silent, to avoid a liability that would be his
if he exercised his right of control. A rule requiring that a doctor
actually exercise his right of control in order that his liability com-
mence would tend to encourage a doctor not to supervise his assistants
properly; a doctor could never be liable for his omission unless by
such omission he would be personally negligent. The result attained
in McKinney is a logical extension of accepted agency principles
into the surgical sphere. In so holding, the court wisely follows the
weight of authority throughout the country on this point.
The problem in the McKinney case is not the result, but the
court's failure to state clearly the reason for its holding. The court
speaks in terms of general Texas agency law in citing a typical in-
dustrial case for the proposition that a servant may have both a gen-
eral and a special employer at the same time;"2 but it is not clear if
the court is also using the general agency test (right of control) in
determining which employer is liable for the servant's torts," or is
attempting to limit right of control in borrowed servant surgical
cases to the operating room. The court relied upon persuasive au-
thority from the Supreme Courts of North Carolina," Oklahoma,"'
Pennsylvania, " and Vermont.' The text of the opinion is composed
primarily of excerpts from these cases, and it is somewhat difficult
to determine just what the court actually is saying. Each case re-
ferred to by the court involved the operative situation, and each
case conveyed the idea that the surgeon's liability would be limited
to the borrowed servant's acts perpetrated during the operation and
while the servant was under the control of the surgeon. Correspond-
ingly, a possible inference might be drawn from the fact that the
court selected McConnell v. Williams, s a case which apparently
arbitrarily limits a doctor's liability to the physical boundaries of
the operating room, rather than one of the later Pennsylvania cases
which has given the borrowed servant doctrine full play in the field
of medicine." The question of how far a doctor's liability should
"Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rust, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 359, 120 S.W. 249 (1909),
error ref.
83In Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1964), the Texas Supreme Court
set out the right of control test. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
34Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d 589 (1952).
"Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1923).
"McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
37Minogue v. Rutland Hospital, 119 Vt. 336, 125 A.2d 796 (1956).
as361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
" Pennsylvania and Kansas are "liberal" jurisdictions in that they have allowed the
borrowed servant doctrine to be applied in all medical situations, both operative and non-
operative. Physicians have been held liable in all situations wherein the standard measure
for the master-servant relationship, right of control, existed. Presence or supervision is not
required. The law is more fully developed in Pennsylvania where more cases have been
1965 ]
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extend remains open. Possibly, an application of the McKinney rule
would require the physician's actual presence. A sufficient right of
control could exist in a borrowed servant relationship in a non-
operative situation if the doctor is present. However, if a hospital-
employed night nurse negligently administers prescribed medication
while the doctor is not present, although a medical function is per-
formed for the physican, there is no indication from the McKinney
opinion that he will be held liable. A good assumption is that the ap-
plication of the borrowed servant doctrine in Texas, based upon the
McKinney opinion, should be limited to factual situations similar to
those of the instant case.
V. BEYOND McKINNEY-ROBLEMS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The doctrine of respondeat superior is a part of the body of the
law of agency, but the true basis for the rule lies in public policy.
The public policy considerations are even more pronounced in the
physician-patient cases. The extent to which the borrowed servant
doctrine will apply to physicians should not be solved by mechanical
application of the principles of agency, but rather by balancing the
needs of the medical profession against those of the community. There
are circumstances which solicit amelioration from a consummate ap-
plication of the borrowed-servant doctrine in medicine in nonoperative
situations. The relationship which a doctor has with his patient is a
personal one. A physician has a duty to practice his profession in the
manner that best serves his patient. In this regard the physician should
be free to concentrate on the patient's general well-being; he should
not be hamstrung by a fear of liability, and charged with the re-
sponsibility of time-consuming rechecking of work done by sup-
posedly competent professionals. Doubtless he is liable for the torts
of his personally selected employees under respondeat superior, for
implicit within that doctrine is a concept of personal selection. How-
ever, quite possibly the only personal selection a physician has if he is
to perform surgery is which hospital to use for the operation, and in
a small community or in emergency situations even that option may
not be available to him. Nevertheless, if like his industrial counter-
part, the physician is willing to benefit pecuniarily from the acts
of his borrowed servants, it is certainly arguable that the same rules
of agency apply in each instance.
decided. Although Pennsylvania does not seem to recognize the "expertise" test, Rockwell
v. Stone, 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961), apparently the medicinal vs. ministerial func-
tion distinction is acquiesced in, Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255- (1959);
Benedict v. Bondi, 384 Pa. 574, 122 A.2d 209 (1956). For an example of the attitude
of the Kansas Court see Voss v. Birdwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364 P.2d 955 (1961).
[Vol. 19
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If physicians are to be immunized from the full thrust of the
borrowed servant doctrine, the patient injured by the negligence of
a hospital nurse, acting within the scope of employment, may be
left with no redress. The physician may not be liable; the nurse is
probably neither sufficiently solvent nor insured; and the nurse's
general employer, the hospital, may well be exempt as a charitable
institution." These considerations, however, do not inevitably compel
the conclusion that reparation should be had from the doctor, al-
though this eventuality would be better than no redress at all. A
better solution might be the extirpation of the obsolete charitable
immunity rule.41
Complicating the pure application of standard agency principles
in this area is the problem that courts have in separating the sur-
geon's vicarious liability imposed without fault from his personal
negligence. A good example of the irresistible urge to refer to the
physician's personal negligence is the opinion in the McKinney case.'
Although the court gave lip service to the borrowed servant doctrine
and the application of respondeat superior principles, there is lan-
guage in the opinion which indicates that the court is still, perhaps
subconsciously, preoccupied with the physician's culpable omission.
40Texas is one of the few (approximately 18) states which still adhere to the chari-
table immunity rule. See Southern Methodist Univ. v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d
749 (1943). In this context, whether or not eradication of the charitable immunity rule
would automatically end a plaintiff's problems would depend upon two additional factors:
the factual determination of whether the nurse was engaged in a ministerial function or
a medical function, and if a medical function, the legal determination of whether the
general employer, the special employer or both -would be liable for the negligent act.
If the performance of a ministerial function results in the injury, the plaintiff's ability to
proceed against the hospital would probably determine his recovery, because under majority
holdings a physician is not liable for a borrowed servant's negligently-performed ministerial
act. If a medical function is performed, possibly a plaintiff would be in no better position
if there were suddenly no charitable immunity doctrine in Texas. If only the special
employer (the physician) would be accountable for the borrowed servant's negligence, the
public policy determination that the physician should not be held liable for his borrowed
servant's torts when he is absent probably would result in the plaintiff's being unable to
recover adequately, since the general employer (the hospital) undoubtedly would assert
the right of control of the physician as a defense to the plaintiff's claim against him.
In order for a patient injured in such a situation to recover against the hospital there must
be joint liability between the special and the general employer. Elimination of the chari-
table immunity rule obviously would not be a complete solution to all the problems in-
volved, but at least it would be a start in the right direction.
" For a discussion of the charitable immunity doctrine and its current status in hos-
pital cases see generally Horty, The Status of the Doctrine of Charitable Immunity in
Hospital Cases, 25 Ohio St. L.J. 343 (1964).
4 In McKinney v. Tromly, 386 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), toward the
end of the opinion the court seems to forget that a master's vicarious liability is liability
imposed without fault. The court said: "We do not believe the rule in Dallas of doctors
using nurses to give anaesthetics will relieve Doctor Tromly of liability in this case." The
court then quoted with approval from a case dealing with a surgeon's personal negligence.
The basis of the doctor's liability in McKinney is the master-servant relationship; whether
it is accepted practice in the community to use nurses for this purpose is irrelevant.
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That is, permeating the court opinions in this area is the unexpressed
idea that the surgeon's liability results from his failure to properly
supervise his assistants. In rationalizing this dilemma the courts
translate their engrossment with the physician's duty into agency
terms, saying that the right of control exists in the operating room,
when the physician is present, but may not exist when the surgeon
is not present." Thus, although the courts speak in terms of agency,
they apparently think in terms of personal liability. If a nurse is
functioning for a physician, it is no more logical, applying strict
agency principles, to say that his right to control exists when that
nurse acts within his presence than when the physician is absent. His
presence can add nothing to the agency relationship. "The control
test, rather, is merely a judicial tool, . . . [a]s such, it is flexible
enough to support any policy a court wishes to pursue."" This is not
to say that the results reached are not good, but it does seem clear
that the courts do not follow strict agency principles in physician-
patient cases."'
VI. CONCLUSION
It is generally beneficial to public welfare, and particularly to an
individual plaintiff, that a victim of medical negligence be compen-
sated for his loss. Moreover, it seems equitable that responsibility for
the loss lie upon the person or entity who is responsible for the well-
being of the patient at the time of the mishap. The proof problems
41 Exemplifying the courts' confusion of supervisory duties with an agency relationship
is this statement from Davis v. Trobough, 139 Mont. 322, 363 P.2d 727, 729 (1961):
"Certainly the surgeon has exclusive control of the nurses in surgery and while he is there.
The same is true while the nurses are with the patient in his presence. But, distinguishing
between that case and the instant cause, the nurses become the temporary servants . . .
of the surgeon in charge while the operation is in progress." (Emphasis added.)
"Note, 50 Geo. L.J. 329, 331 (1962).
" Partially accountable for this confusion are the built-in problems confronted in
attempting to prove negligence upon a doctor. The standard of care to which doctors are
held somewhat approximates the conduct expected from a reasonably prudent doctor
under similar circumstances. The doctor's deviation from that standard can generally
be proven only by competent medical testimony, given by his professional peers within
the community. See Bowles v. Bourdon, 213 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), aff'd,
219 S.W.2d 779 (1949). Unfortunately the rule does not always work the way it was
intended; doctors comprise a homogeneous group and a plaintiff's counsel has a difficult
time finding a "reasonably prudent" doctor who will testify "for the record," except to
the rankest sort of negligent conduct. Rarely is a doctor found personally negligent for
his omission. Some jurisdictions partially remedy this shortcoming by using the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to aid injured patients in proving negligence, thereby shifting to the
surgeon the problem of eliciting expert testimony indicating conformity to the standard
of care required. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944);
Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 248 Iowa 294, 79 N.W.2d
306 (1956); Jensen v. Linner, 260 Minn. 22, 108 N.W.2d 705 (1961); Foxton v. Wood-
house, 236 Ore. 271, 386 P.2d 659 (1963). For a discussion of the more recent develop-
ments in this area, see Brophy, Highlights on Res lpsa Loquitur in Medical Malfsractice
Cases, 1964 Ins. L.J. 645.
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inherent in the medical standard of care and the charitable immunity
doctrine interlock to erect a formidable barrier to a plaintiff. It seems
clear that in operating or treatment rooms the physician is completely
in control and should be charged with a duty of supervising his bor-
rowed servants; and even absent his personal negligence, the physician
should be held liable, vicariously, for the negligent acts of such
servants. In nonoperative situations, when the physician is not pres-
ent, it seems better public policy to allow physicians to assume that
hospital personnel will function competently regardless of whether
such a result would conform to usual agency rules. A physician's time
is a valuable community resource and it must be conserved. In order
for a physician to use his time to best advantage he should be relieved
from worry about possible personal liability occasioned by the acts
of hospital personnel while he is away. In the medical profession
there is a personal relationship not to be found in industry. Perhaps
the special needs of this unique relationship warrant the application
of specialized rules. Therefore, any extension of the rule of the
McKinney case should come only after careful evaluation of the
policy considerations involved. If a patient, injured by the negligence
of hospital personnel, is left without a financially responsible de-
fendant, it is probably the charitable immunity rule that is to blame
and not an unwarranted limitation of agency principles as applied
to physicians.
Terry S. Stanford
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